TOOL / Coding agent

Claude Code

Claude Code is Anthropic's coding agent for working with projects from a terminal or desktop interface, including codebase analysis, file edits, and command execution; this sourced profile is workflow context, not a ShipStackLab hands-on recommendation.

PROFILE PARTIALNOT YET TESTEDChecked 2026-10-14

What Claude Code does

Before running Claude Code, review workspace scope, loaded policies and MCP tools, and keep secrets outside the permitted scope.
AI-generated editorial illustration by ShipStackLab, not an official Claude Code screenshot. These are review categories, not proof that policies loaded or that a workspace is safe. ShipStackLab has not independently tested the fixes.

October 14 review of v2.1.299: Anthropic reports a server-managed settings request to Anthropic could carry a third-party gateway API key when a managed settings file sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL. The release also fixes a teammate description retaining a credential fragment from its prompt. These are vendor-reported fixes for specific paths, not evidence that your credentials were exposed or that earlier copies were removed.

Plugin and run boundaries in v2.1.299: a sandboxed shell could write into a --plugin-dir folder whose code is reloaded and executed outside the sandbox. A mod submitting a prompt after every turn could keep a headless run going past --max-turns, --max-budget-usd, an interrupt or the host conversation's end. Anthropic reports fixes for these paths; remotely disabled mods now unload between turns. A configured sandbox or budget limit alone is not proof of effective enforcement.

October 10 review of v2.1.296: Anthropic reports that headless sessions could start a folder-disabled .mcp.json or plugin MCP server after directory changes or plugin reloads. The release also corrects incomplete secret masking in shared transcripts and debug logs, including some shell-embedded JSON. It fixes Bash permission checks that silently allowed certain BASH_ARGV0 assignments followed by use. These are vendor-reported fixes for specific paths, not proof of blanket safety or absence of earlier exposure.

Browser scope in v2.1.296: cloud sessions correct an auto-mode check skipped for saved browser permissions before feature flags loaded. VS Code now requests approval for browser actions in every session, including @browser; a site approval lasts for that session. This does not authorize unrelated sites or actions.

October 9 review of v2.1.295: Anthropic reports corrected --tools and --restricted enforcement for late-registering built-in tools and deprecated names. It also fixes truncated inputs reaching mod guard hooks, reload-time calls bypassing another mod's guard, and tampered server-policy caches treating personal plugins as organization-managed. These are vendor-reported fixes, not independent verification of prior enforcement.

The hooks reference documents opt-in onFailure: "block" for command and HTTP hooks in v2.1.295 or later; the default remains "continue". For applicable events, it can block on startup failure, timeout, unexpected exit codes, HTTP errors or invalid JSON output. The effect follows the event: PreToolUse blocks the tool call and PermissionRequest denies the request. It has no effect on Stop, SubagentStop, TaskCompleted, TeammateIdle or background command hooks. This is separate from v2.1.294's prompt/agent-hook fix and does not make every hook fail closed.

October 8 review of v2.1.294: Anthropic reports a fix for instruction-style prompt and agent hooks permitting actions they were meant to block. It also improves instruction-style prompt-hook judgments on Stop and SubagentStop to reduce premature stopping. The release describes these hook cases, not a guarantee that every hook or completed task is correct.

October 7 review of v2.1.292: Anthropic reports corrected approval checks for network (UNC) file reads, including PreToolUse hook approvals and auto mode. Managed sandbox read-deny paths that appear or change destination during a session now remove covered project grants and stop credential injection from covered files. The release also closes access to staged /ultrareview upload copies from sandboxed commands.

The same release addresses tampered cached server-managed settings disabling the policy plugin during a failed fetch, first-run plugin commands preceding organization-policy loading, and tool calls missing permission hooks during a plugin worker restart. These are vendor-reported fixes for specified paths, not evidence that every plugin or previously running session was safe.

October 6 review of v2.1.289: Anthropic reports fixes for compound-command deny/ask rules being overridden by user-installed mods on managed machines, Read restrictions missing IDE-selected files reached through symlinks, and Bash rules missed under sandbox auto-allow with variable prefixes or preceding assignments. The release also prevents plugins from rewriting organization-managed MCP sign-in tool descriptions. These are version-specific vendor reports, not a blanket safety claim.

October 1 review of v2.1.286: Anthropic documents additional credential-redaction fixes for MCP errors, encoded Bearer tokens, invisible characters in secret key names, and complex URL passwords in logs and transcripts. Remote Control sessions now disconnect with a notice when the organization disables Remote Control. These are vendor-reported fixes, not proof that historical logs contain no secrets.

September 30 review: v2.1.284 fixes plugin self-preapproval under allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly, preserving exceptions for Anthropic or managed-trusted sources. Elicitation and ElicitationResult hooks returning a block decision now decline MCP elicitation. These controls are not blanket trust in a plugin or MCP server.

v2.1.285 fixes PowerShell deny/ask checks being skipped when its parser cannot start, URL-password redaction, and /ultrareview credential-file filtering for unusual names. It also removes tools when an MCP server added mid-session is disabled in SDK or -p sessions.

Managed-policy exception in v2.1.285: OS-denied access to the managed settings file now produces a warning and startup without that file's policies. Other read failures or unparseable files still stop sessions. Do not equate successful startup with loaded policy. Unconfigured -p and Python Agent SDK sessions on third-party providers or with telemetry disabled now start in auto mode; --permission-mode overrides it.

Claude Code is Anthropic's coding agent for analyzing projects, editing files, and running development commands from terminal and desktop workflows.

September 28 review of v2.1.283: invalid nested managed sandbox settings now fail closed without discarding the remaining policy. The release also fixes Windows deletion safeguards and a VS Code indicator that could show Default while auto or bypass mode remained active. Third-party-provider or telemetry-disabled interactive sessions now start in auto mode if no permission mode is configured; permissions.defaultMode still overrides this.

Telemetry boundary: with OTEL_LOG_TOOL_CONTENT=1, v2.1.283 includes MCP, WebFetch and WebSearch outputs in tool.output telemetry events. The release also reverses v2.1.282's claude-ai namespace reservation; matching Skill rules are ordinary prefix rules again, not a reserved-name safeguard.

Claude Code v2.1.280 fixes permission checks for writes through symbolic links: approval now reflects the actual destination rather than a path that appears inside the working tree. acceptEdits, allow rules and auto mode no longer approve the affected out-of-tree writes on that basis. Auto mode also stops retrying an action when a safety check declines to review it; unanswered safety checks back off and stop the turn after ten consecutive failures.

Claude Code v2.1.277 fixes malformed strictKnownMarketplaces or blockedMarketplaces entries disabling enterprise marketplace policy. It also narrows sandbox.excludedCommands matching: all parts of a compound Bash command must qualify for exemption, not just one part.

The same release adds AGENTS.md fallback when CLAUDE.md is absent, with a Project instructions choice in /config; Bedrock, Vertex and Foundry are excluded at this release.

In v2.1.278, auto mode defaults to server-side classification for Claude API and Enterprise users, plus Bedrock, Vertex, Foundry and gateways. That route has no classifier-overhead charge; billed fallback triggers a warning. Task inference and subscription costs remain separate.

Claude Code v2.1.269 documents fixes for session plugin archives being readable by other local users, retaining world-writable permissions, and leaving stale files after re-extraction. It also fixes Edit() deny rules and write-path checks not applying to Bash tee destinations: allowing Bash(tee:*) no longer authorizes writes outside the working directories.

Claude Code v2.1.271 corrects stale organization policy after account or credential changes. An unreadable or malformed enterprise managed-mcp.json now retains exclusive MCP control and raises a warning rather than loading user, project, or plugin servers. The release also documents fixes to Bash path checks, including chained directory changes.

In v2.1.273, MCP restrictions supplied through MDM or managed-settings.json are respected alongside server-managed settings. The release also fixes missed prompts for Bash commands the checker cannot fully analyze, a dangerous removal command hidden in a subshell in bypass mode, and repository-selected memory escaping the configured working-directory read boundary.

Claude Code v2.1.274 documents fixes for MCP errors and login descriptions exposing secrets expanded from configuration variables, missed Bash permission prompts for certain special shell variables, and nested shell expansions accepted in worktree-isolated sessions. It also corrects edit-approval previews for multibyte text. v2.1.275 redacts credentials embedded in plugin and marketplace URLs from messages, logs and listings; npm-source plugins are fetched with npm pack --ignore-scripts and integrity verification, without running package install scripts.

Its value depends on the surrounding engineering discipline: scoped requests, visible permissions, reviewable diffs, deterministic checks, and a repository state that can be recovered.

With the Fable 5.1 release, Anthropic documents High as Claude Code's default effort, versus Medium in Claude.ai and Cowork. Record the selected model and effort explicitly when comparing runs across surfaces.

The preserved-thinking API change does not apply to ordinary Claude Code use. For custom Messages API integrations using Fable 5.1, it applies to API accounts or projects created on or after August 31, 2026 at 00:00 UTC; integrations that rewrite earlier turns need a separate compatibility review.

Workflow role

  • build

Inputs and outputs

Inputs

  • Local project or repository
  • Coding task and implementation constraints

Outputs

  • Code and configuration edits
  • Command output, test results, and implementation summary

Compatible tools

UNKNOWN

Ownership and deployment

Code ownershipUNKNOWNUNKNOWN · Official code-ownership evidence has not been recorded. · Checked 2026-08-19
Data ownershipUNKNOWNUNKNOWN · Official data-ownership evidence has not been recorded. · Checked 2026-08-19
Deployment modelInstallable on macOS, Windows, and Linux for project work, with an internet connection requiredVERIFIED · Official source evidence recorded · Checked 2026-08-19
Pricing statusUNKNOWNUNKNOWN · Current pricing evidence has not been recorded. · Checked 2026-08-19

Suitable and unsuitable tasks

Suitable

  • Analyzing and implementing scoped changes in an existing software project

Not established

  • Acting as a no-code visual site builder or managed application backend

Known limitations and unknowns

  • No hands-on limitations have been verified by ShipStackLab.UNKNOWN · Checked 2026-08-19

Adoption checks

  • Set project instructions and permission boundaries before giving the agent access to commands or sensitive files.
  • For v2.1.299, record the client version, effective gateway route, managed settings and plugin sources before sensitive work. Keep plugin directories outside sandbox write permissions and check actual run termination separately from configured limits. Review only redacted evidence; the credential owner should revoke or rotate known exposed secrets. Do not install tools, reproduce credential leakage or weaken protections just to validate this profile. ShipStackLab has not independently tested v2.1.299; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.296, record client surface, version, enabled MCP servers and browser approvals. Keep credentials out of logs and shared transcripts; review historical exposure without republishing secrets. Any behavior test needs separate authorization and disposable data. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.295, record the effective tool set, managed plugin provenance, hook type, event and failure policy. Only a separately authorized disposable trial can verify harmless denial and hook-failure cases. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • ShipStackLab checklist for v2.1.294: record client version, hook type, event and intended allow/block decision. In a separately authorized disposable repository, check harmless allowed and blocked cases, then compare Stop and SubagentStop decisions with actual build/test output. Keep permissions and deterministic verification independent of model-judged hooks; do not weaken controls to finish a run. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; prior hook enforcement remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.292, record the client version, loaded policy, resolved read destinations and enabled plugins. Stop sensitive work on a policy-load warning; a hook approval is not blanket permission for network reads. Verify denial behavior only in a separately authorized disposable repository, without weakening controls. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.289, record the installed version, loaded policy, actual read destination and enabled mods/plugins. Preserve deny/ask rules across compound commands and review organization-managed MCP provenance separately from its displayed description. Use only an authorized disposable repository for behavioral verification; do not relax sandbox rules to complete a check. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.286, record the client version and effective organization policy; verify Remote Control disconnect behavior only in a separately authorized test. Keep raw logs and transcripts private, share only redacted evidence, and have the credential owner revoke or rotate known exposed secrets. A client update does not remove earlier copies or establish provider-side revocation. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; past exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • ShipStackLab review checklist for v2.1.284–285: record client version, effective permission mode, loaded policy and enabled MCP tools. Stop sensitive work on a policy-load warning and have the administrator resolve it; do not bypass controls. Inspect upload scope without exposing secrets. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; historical exposure remains UNKNOWN.
  • For v2.1.283, record the effective permission mode and managed sandbox policy rather than relying only on the status indicator. Before opting into tool-content telemetry, review destination, access and retention for potentially sensitive outputs. These are vendor-documented changes, not a ShipStackLab security audit; past exposure remains UNKNOWN. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes.
  • For v2.1.280, review the resolved write destination as well as the visible path and permission mode. Do not widen directory access or bypass a declined safety check just to continue. A separately authorized evaluation should use disposable files and confirm denied destinations remain unchanged. ShipStackLab has not reproduced these issues or independently tested the fixes; updating a client does not establish whether earlier writes escaped the intended scope.
  • For v2.1.277, review marketplace policy and sandbox exemptions without disabling controls to clear a warning. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes. For v2.1.278 cost records, check the Auto mode server row in /status and retain any billed-fallback warning; do not infer free task execution.
  • For v2.1.274 and v2.1.275, check the installed client and effective permission settings before trusting the revised behavior. Keep credentials out of repository and marketplace URLs; review potentially exposed logs without republishing secrets, and rotate credentials known to be exposed. Verify plugin provenance separately: suppressed install scripts do not make all plugin runtime actions safe. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes or established whether past exposure occurred.
  • Check the client version and plugin provenance before relying on these v2.1.269 fixes. Keep sensitive files outside the agent's permitted scope, and review file destinations as well as command permissions. For an authorized evaluation, use disposable files to verify denied writes remain denied. These release notes are not proof that every plugin is safe or that past exposure did not occur; ShipStackLab has not reproduced the issues or independently tested the fixes.
  • For the v2.1.271 and v2.1.273 boundaries, record permission mode, policy sources, permitted directories, and MCP servers. Do not silence an enterprise configuration warning by disabling its controls. Check allowManagedMcpServersOnly, deniedMcpServers, and disableClaudeAiConnectors in the effective policy. ShipStackLab has not independently tested these fixes; a vendor release is not proof of blanket safety or absence of past exposure.
  • Compare the final diff and verification output with the original acceptance criteria rather than the agent summary.
  • Pin client version, model, effort, enabled tools, and permission mode in the run record. Separate subscription usage from API-billed input, output, and cache tokens before making a cost claim.

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